Hamid Gharavi et Nada Sader obtiennent une sentence octroyant US$39,2 millions de dommages contre le Kazakhstan

Hamid Gharavi et Nada Sader ont obtenu une sentence octroyant US$39,2 millions de dommages contre le Kazakhstan (plus de US$ 53 millions avec les intérêts) dans l’arbitrage CIRDI Caratube International Oil Co. LLP and Devincci Salah Hourani v. Republic of Kazakhstan, affaire no. ARB/13/13. Cette importante victoire a été rapportée dans des articles du Global Arbitration Review (GAR) et de Law 360 dans les termes suivants :

Article du GAR du 29 septembre 2017:

Caratube tribunal vindicates Gharavi’s decision to bring second claim

The award in Caratube II vindicates the decision of Hamid Gharavi of Derains & Gharavi to bring a second case against Kazakhstan on behalf of the oil company after jurisdiction was refused first time round, dismissing the state’s objections in their entirety and awarding US$39.2 million in damages. Claims by the company’s majority stakeholder, Devinnci Hourani, were dismissed on jurisdictional grounds.

In the first ICSID claim brought by Caratube International Oil Company under the US-Kazakhstan bilateral investment treaty, the tribunal said there was no evidence of “foreign control” of the company and suggested that Devincci Hourani was a mere « puppet » of the true owners, alleged to be his brother Isaam Hourani and one of his companies.

In light of those findings, there must have been many who doubted the success chances of Caratube’s second claim filed by Gharavi – who was not counsel for the company first time round – even though it was based not on the BIT but on a contract and Kazakhstan’s foreign investment law.

But in an award issued to the parties on 27 September, a tribunal including Laurent Lévy, Laurent Aynès and Jacques Salès upheld jurisdiction over Caratube’s claims, rejecting Kazakhstan’s defences that they were an abuse of process, time-barred and precluded because of collateral estoppel and res judicata. It also said Caratube had been « fully justified » in bringing the claims even though it evidently thought the US$1 billion of damages sought was excessive.

The tribunal further ruled that the claims were not precluded by Article 25 of the ICSID Convention, as argued by Kazakhstan. This article says at subparagraph 1 that for jurisdiction to be established there needs to be consent to ICSID arbitration and the investment in dispute needs to have been made by a “national of another contracting state” to the respondent state.

Article 25(2)(b) defines that phrase, saying it includes “any juridical person which had the nationality of the contracting state party to the dispute [on the date of consent to ICSID arbitration] and which, because of foreign control, the parties have agreed should be treated as a national of another contracting state for the purposes of the convention”.
It was on the basis of this article, read with the US-Kazakhstan BIT, that the claim in Caratube I failed – with the tribunal ruling that the Kazakh-registered claimant company had not proved that it was controlled by Devincci Hourani, a US national since 2001, and was therefore a foreign investment.

Commentators have noted that this imposed a higher jurisdictional threshold under Article 25(2)(b) of the ICSID Convention than exists in the US-Kazakhstan BIT, which says that investors must have ownership or control but not necessarily both.
The findings on abuse of process, whether the claim was time-barred, collateral estoppel and res judicata

In the latest award, the tribunal first found that Caratube was not guilty of an abuse of process – rejecting Kazakhstan’s suggestion that it had deliberately failed to raise all its claims in Caratube I in a bad faith attempt to pave the way for a further case.

Nor did the tribunal accept that Devincci Hourani was made majority shareholder of Caratube (with a 92% stake bought for a US$6,500) as a “frontman for the real parties in interest” – to give them access to ICSID jurisdiction.

Hourani became a US national in 2001 and the majority shareholder in Caratube in 2004, several years before the termination of the contract and start of ICSID proceedings, the tribunal said. It added that it did not have the power to rule, as Kazakhstan wanted, that his US nationality was illegally obtained on the basis of a false statement that he was married – this was a matter for the competent US authorities to decide.

With regard to the argument that the claim was “time barred”, the tribunal said that to prevent it would be incompatible with “international prescription principles”. Caratube had acted promptly in initiating Caratube I after the termination of the contract “on a jurisdictional basis that was not manifestly unfounded”, it said. The company was thus anything but “in repose” about its rights and it was not its fault that the Caratube I tribunal took more than three years to deny jurisdiction.

On collateral estoppel, the tribunal held that the Caratube I award had not included a final and binding decision with respect to who actually controlled the company or made a “standalone” decision on the definition of investment under Article 25 of the ICSID Convention.

Kazakhstan’s res judicata defence similarly foundered on the grouds that the claims in the second case were based on contract and Kazakhstan’s foreign investment law, not the BIT used in the first case. This distinction ensured Caratube’s right to access ICSID jurisdiction and to be heard, the tribunal said.

Article 25

Turning to Article 25, the tribunal held that Kazakhstan had agreed in its contract with Caratube to treat it as a foreign national and found no reason to disregard Devincci Hourani’s ownership of Caratube in favour of piercing the corporate veil.
It also said Kazakhstan had not rebutted the presumption that Caratube was under foreign control at all relevant times.

The tribunal gave careful consideration to the contract in the case, signed in 1994 by Kazakhstan’s Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources and a Lebanese construction company that later assigned its rights to Caratube. In this contract, it said the parties had agreed that their transaction was a foreign investment and consented to ICSID arbitration of any disputes.

There was no allegation by Kazakhstan that it was an ordinary commercial transaction falling outside the objective meaning of an investment, it noted.

The tribunal rejected also rejeted the notion that either Caratube or Devinnci Hourani were “mere puppets” for Issam Hourani and his company. Kazakhstan had provided “no explanation” as to why one of the brothers would hide behind the other in relation to this project, when they were joint shareholders of other companies – such as the pharmaceutical plant that is the subject of the other pending ICSID claim – it said.
Based on the contract, the tribunal found that its jurisdiction covered Caratube’s claims against Kazakhstan for breach of the foreign investment law. It accordingly did not need to decide whether it had jurisdiction on any other basis.

Was Caratube I tainted?

Gharavi and his team were less successful in persuading the tribunal to accept jurisdiction over a claim by Devincci Hourani in person. It held that Kazakhstan had repealed its foreign investment law a year before he acquired his shares in Caratube. However, speaking to GAR, Gharavi notes that he only needed to establish jurisdiction in relation to Caratube, since Hourani owns the company.

« The tribunal’s holding that Caratube – a company owned by a US national of Palestinian origin – met ICSID’s nationality and investment requirements, and that Devincci Hourani was a bona fide investor, serves to highlight how the award of the tribunal in Caratube I was tainted by ignorance of international law and prejudice, » he says.

What is clear is that the award’s highly technical jurisdictional findings are likely to be poured over by arbitration lawyers for many days to come”.

Article de LAW 360 du 29 septembre 2017:

Kazakhstan Must Pay $39M In Oil Field Dispute, Tribunal Says

An international tribunal has ordered Kazakhstan to pay $39 million to Caratube International Oil Co. LLP, concluding that Kazakhstan expropriated the company’s investment in the country by unlawfully terminating a contract to develop oil fields.

The International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes tribunal concluded in its award, dated Wednesday and published Friday, that Kazakhstan had breached its obligations to Caratube when it terminated their contract, depriving the company of its existing rights to exclusively explore and develop the oil fields. In fact, at the time the contract was terminated in 2008, Caratube still had the right to perform under the contract until May 2009 and, if necessary, to extend the exploration period another two years.

« Based on the foregoing, a majority of the tribunal concludes that the respondent unlawfully terminated the contract, » according to the award. « Due to this unlawful termination of the contract, CIOC, at the time of the termination, was unreasonably and substantially deprived of its existing rights under the contract. »

The tribunal rejected arguments put forward by Kazakhstan that Caratube had obtained an initial extension of the contract by misrepresenting whether a certain seismic study had been successfully completed, which would have meant that it was in a position to begin its key exploration obligation of drilling four deep wells.

And although the tribunal did conclude that Caratube had failed to comply with some of its financial obligations under the contract, it concluded that Kazakhstan had not adequately notified Caratube of certain alleged material breaches.

Kazakhstan’s appointed arbitrator, Jacques Salès, dissented on these points, concluding that the study was unusable and amounted to a material breach of the contract, and that Kazakhstan had given Caratube adequate notice of its breach. That meant Kazakhstan had the right to terminate the contract, he said.

Turning to damages, the tribunal rejected Caratube’s claims for lost profits that could have come from the sale of oil obtained from the field or from the sale of the company, or lost opportunities, concluding that the claimants hadn’t sufficiently or convincingly established either of these claims. Instead, it awarded $39.2 million, representing investment costs spent by Caratube.

The tribunal concluded it did not have jurisdiction over claims put forward by Caratube’s majority shareholder, Devincci Hourani, a U.S. national. The tribunal also rejected allegations that Kazakhstan had engaged in a politically motivated campaign against the Hourani family, concluding that the claimants had not been able to specifically prove the country’s involvement in the alleged acts of harassment.

Attorneys for both sides hailed the award as a victory Friday.

« The award is yet another example that it ultimately serves no purpose for states such as Kazakhstan to give a legal spin to a political taking, as the tribunal found, and then spend tens of millions of USD of the state budget in legal fees, which Kazakhstan did in the case at hand, to defend by creative arguments on jurisdiction and merits, » said Hamid Gharavi of Derains & Gharavi International in Paris, who represented the claimants.

Curtis Mallet-Prevost Colt & Mosle LLP partner Peter M. Wolrich, representing Kazakhstan, meanwhile, pointed out that the $39 million award is a « mere fraction » of the $991 million the claimants had sought.

« This is a typical unfortunate example of what happens in arbitrations when claimants make ridiculous exaggerated claims. It makes cases far longer and far more expensive, » he said, adding that exaggerated claims negatively affect the public’s perception of the arbitration process.

The dispute has its origins in a 2002 contract providing for the exploration and production of hydrocarbons entered into by Kazakhstan’s Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources and an international construction company called Consolidated Contractors (Oil and Gas) Co. SAL. The contract was later assigned to Caratube.

Under the contract, Consolidated Contractors and later Caratube were charged with demonstrating the commerciality of certain oil reservoirs that had been discovered in the 1960s, and to explore certain other reservoirs though seismic surveys and the drilling of exploration wells.

The parties differed on whether Caratube had met its obligations under the contract. Kazakhstan claimed that Caratube was in a persistent state of material breach of its obligations under the contract, and that the company was only interested in taking advantage of certain known deposits and wells to produce oil for its own benefit, rather than to carry out essential exploration, according to the award.

Kazakhstan ordered Caratube to halt its operations under the contract in 2007, and the contract was ultimately terminated in 2008.

Meanwhile, Caratube and Hourani alleged that they were caught up in a dispute between the president of the Republic of Kazakhstan, Nursultan Nazarbayev, and his son-in-law at the time, Rakhat Aliyev, because the Hourani family was thought to have given Aliyev assistance.

Aliyev and certain members of the Hourani family have been accused of a number of serious crimes, including money laundering, kidnapping, sequestration, torture, murder, extortion and corporate raiding. The claimants contend that certain members of the Hourani family were targeted by Kazakhstan for alleged criminal matters, and certain of Caratube’s documents were seized as part of this campaign of harassment. In addition, beginning in 2007, Caratube was subjected to an « avalanche » of state inspections and audits, the claimants said.

The arbitration is the second between the parties. An initial arbitration submitted in 2008 was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction in 2012.

The tribunal was led by Laurent Lévy and included the claimants’ appointee, Laurent Aynès, and the dissenting arbitrator, Salès.

The claimants are represented by Hamid G. Gharavi and Nada Sader of Derains & Gharavi.

Kazakhstan is represented by Peter M. Wolrich, Geoffroy Lyonnet, Gabriela Alvarez Avila, Jérôme Lehucher, Yerzhan Mukhitdinov, Marie-Claire Argac, Lisa Arpin-Pont and Olena Stasyk of Curtis Mallet-Prevost Colt & Mosle LLP. Two other attorneys, Anna Kouyaté and Svetlana Evliya, who are no longer with Curtis, also represented the country.

The case is Caratube International Oil Co. LLP and Devincci Salah Hourani v. Republic of Kazakhstan, case number ARB/13/13, in the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes”.

20th Annual IBA International Arbitration Day

Yves Derains interviendra sur le thème de : « The role of the Tribunal in the assessment of the burden of proof, inquisitorial v. adversarial arbitrators » lors de la conférence « 20th Annual IBA International Arbitration Day » dédiée à « the burden and standard of proof in international arbitration and related proceedings », les 30 et 31 mars 2017 à Milan.

Derains & Gharavi secures its third ICSID win for Albania over an investment dispute concerning its petroleum industry

Derains & Gharavi obtained on 30 March 2015 another Award in favor of the Republic of Albania, dismissing all claims amounting to approximately USD 48 million for lack of merits (ICSID Case No. ARB/11/24). The claims were brought by a Greek petroleum company under the Greek-Albanian BIT and the ECT for the alleged expropriation and unfair treatment of an investment in an oil container terminal in Albania’s Port of Durres. Please click here to read the full Award and here to read the dissenting opinion. This is the third victory the firm secured out of the three cases it has handled for the Republic of Albania before ICSID. Its first victory for the Republic of Albania was against Pantechniki and concerned the alleged unfair treatment and denial of justice against an investment in the construction industry (ICSID Case No. ARB/07/21). Its second win was against Burimi S.r.l. and Eagle Games Sh.a., concerning the alleged expropriation of a gambling permit (ICSID Case No. ARB/11/18).
The latest win for the Republic of Albania marks the firm’s ninth victory in ICSID arbitration out of nine cases so far, providing the firm to date with an uninterrupted track-record in arbitrations before ICSID (Pantechniki v. Republic of Albania (ICSID Case No. ARB/07/21), Saba Fakes v. Republic of Turkey (ICSID Case No. ARB/07/20), Investors DLP v. Republic of Yemen (ICSID Case No. ARB/05/17), Rumeli/Telsim v. Republic of Kazakhstan (ICSID Case No. ARB/05/16), Lemire v. Republic of Ukraine (ICSID Case No. ARB/06/18), Burimi S.r.l. and Eagle Games Sh.a. v. Republic of Albania, Arif v. Republic of Moldova (ICSID Case No. ARB/11/23) and Lahoud et al. v. the Democratic Republic of Congo (ICSID Case No. ARB/10/4)).

ICSID annulment committees: the elephant in the room

Published in GAR on 24 November 2014

« ICSID annulment committees: the elephant in the room » by Hamid Gharavi

« As ICSID prepares to mark its 50th anniversary next year, investment arbitration specialist Hamid Gharavi of Derains & Gharavi in Paris says it is time to talk about serious shortcomings in the centre’s rules on annulment proceedings – a rare act of public criticism by a frequent user of the centre ».

The title of this article refers to a looming issue that is not receiving the attention it deserves: the unbalanced and extraordinary power that the secretary-general of ICSID holds in practice in relation to annulment proceedings at the centre. My comments are not directed at any individual secretary general but at the way the role functions.

I have in fact addressed this issue before, in a presentation and publication five years ago to mark the 45th anniversary of ICSID. At the time, however, I only raised it shyly. The elephant was just born, and had not grown to the size it has today.

Moreover, I have hesitated to broach the issue again as criticism of any well-established system is often perceived as a sign of bitterness. There is also the risk of being sidelined and of prompting emotional and overzealous defences of the system.

I have thus taken a step back – all the while gaining, I hope, a sufficient track record with ICSID not to be portrayed as embittered – and watched the baby elephant grow to a size where it can no longer be ignored.

I have been a strong supporter and frequent user of ICSID since I started to practise, and have always favoured ICSID arbitration over other options. I have represented the successful party in over a dozen arbitrations and annulment procedures, and have lost two annulment applications where I was not counsel in the underlying arbitration.

In addition, I am a member of the ICSID panel of arbitrators and both the current secretary-general and her predecessor have called upon me to serve on tribunals. In other words, I have every incentive to militate for the status quo. I have decided to raise this issue at last to flag the problem and to instigate a constructive debate to improve the system.

Appointments in one person’s hands

At ICSID, the default appointment of arbitrators in theory lies in the hands of the president of the Administrative Council, but in practice it lies exclusively in the hands of the secretary-general, who makes the appointment on his or her behalf. The same goes for annulment proceedings, except that the parties are not allowed to make appointments. Again, it is in practice the secretary-general who makes all appointments.

This is the extraordinary singularity of the ICSID system. It has a unique annulment system, overseen by ad hoc committees whose members are in practice all appointed by one person. Compare this with the ICC International Court of Arbitration, where arbitrator appointments are often referred to national committees in good standing, which propose candidates to be considered and confirmed by the ICC Court. Or compare it to applications to set aside non-ICSID awards, which are heard by the judiciary at the seat of the arbitration.

The question is whether it is reasonable to leave the task of appointing all the members of ad hoc committees to a single person when this task so often determines the outcome of the case. I submit that it is unwise and unappealing – even more so today considering the exponential development of investment arbitration and the fact that ICSID disputes often involve sovereign property or state public policy measures and have a high monetary value.

ICSID’s attitude to the annulment system

The issue is aggravated by the fact that the secretary general may express, in public or private, views on the scope of the annulment mechanism – or may, rightly or wrongly, be perceived to have such views. Some secretary generals have in fact expressed such views, since the time of the late Ibrahim Shihata (secretary general of ICSID from 1983 to 2000). It is inappropriate for any ICSID administrative personnel to express such views, particularly when he or she has an exclusive function to appoint annulment committees.

Such views can have a practical impact on proceedings. In one annulment case in 2010-2011 in which I acted for the state, Togo Electricité and GDF-Suez Energie Services v Togo, the sophisticated and experienced counsel for the investors defending the award went so far as to plead on the record that annulling the award on the grounds invoked by Togo would hurt the ICSID system and upset the secretary general. His exact words to the ad hoc committee were: “I think that by [not annulling], you would be making ICSID arbitration improve, and I am sure that you will not be displeasing [the secretary general] of ICSID who has again recently declared that ‘the Klöckner era is behind us, it is over’” – a reference to the controversial annulment of the award in Klöckner v Cameroon in 1983.

The Togo annulment proceedings came in the aftermath of the wave of criticism that greeted the decisions of ad hoc committees to annul the awards in Enron v Argentina and Sempra v Argentina in 2010. Some perceived, rightly or wrongly, that the World Bank hierarchy also disapproved of those annulment decisions because of the impact on US shareholders’ and creditors’ interests and because of the fear of a revival of the controversy that followed the Klöckner annulment, with all the adverse consequences it may have had on ICSID’s reputation.

Whether a plea such as the one made by the investors’ counsel in the Togo case would have an impact does not matter. The mere fact that it was thought to be worth a try is proof of the problem.

A source of further concern is the allegations and admissions that have been made, whether accurate or not, that ICSID has intervened in the substantive decisions of ad hoc committee members in certain cases; and that some appointments to ad hoc committees have been based on whether the candidate is perceived as likely to favour annulment. Again, it does not matter whether these allegations are true; what matters is the perception and whether there are checks and balances to prevent this from occurring.

Dual roles on tribunals and ad hoc committees

There have also been worrying occasions where ad hoc committees appointed by the secretary general have included members of tribunals whose awards are the subject of annulment applications. For example, in the Togo annulment proceeding, Albert Jan van den Berg was appointed as president of the ad hoc committee in November 2010, only a few months after the award he had rendered as a member of the Enron v Argentina tribunal had been annulled by another ad hoc committee.
In other words, Togo had to rely on the Enron annulment decision, fresh out of the oven, in its arguments before one of the authors of the Enron award that had been recently annulled. This simply should not be permitted.

We all know that most cases are not black and white and that ad hoc committees have some scope to side with either party. Committee members may say that the treatment of their awards by another annulment committee has no influence on their decision-making. But is that enough? As a member of the ICSID panel, I too could be appointed as an ad hoc committee member even though there is a pending annulment application at ICSID against an award I joined in as arbitrator in H&H Enterprises Investments v Egypt. If I declared that this would not influence my decision-making, would observers believe that I was stating a genuinely held view or protecting my stake in the system?

Such declarations by human beings with personal and professional pride, denying any form of subconscious bias, are not necessarily enough to reassure all parties to an annulment proceeding and their representatives, who may deserve a right of veto in these circumstances. In any event, the mere existence of a risk or perception of bias undermines the credibility of the institution and arbitral process. It creates discomfort among the parties where there should not be any – especially considering the exclusive nature of the ICSID annulment regime as a means of challenging awards, the absence of any recourses against annulment decisions and the large monetary and strategic interests potentially at stake.

There are many instances other than the one mentioned above where the secretary general has appointed committee members whose awards are or have been subject to annulment requests. While the practice of acting as both arbitrator and counsel at ICSID has given rise to some criticism, the dual role of arbitrators and ad hoc committee members has escaped attention. And when one acting secretary-general, Nassib Ziadé, attempted to address the issue by asking members of ad hoc committees not to accept appointments on tribunals, he encountered resistance.

In non-ICSID arbitrations, the problem does not arise because annulment applications are heard by judges. For a judge to sit on first-instance and appellate benches at the same time would be unthinkable.

Challenging ad hoc committee members

I turn to the mechanism to challenge arbitrators and ad hoc committee members at ICSID. Such challenges are heard by the non-challenged members of the tribunal or ad hoc committee. There are exceptions to the peer review of the arbitrator challenge, namely when two of the three panellists are being challenged. In this circumstance, the challenge is heard by the president of Administrative Council, which means again in practice the secretary general of ICSID, the very person who has made the appointments in the first place.

In a pending annulment application, Kılıç İnşaat v Turkmenistan, in which I am representing the applicant, two of the ad hoc committee members appointed by the secretary general have had annulment applications brought against their awards in other cases. One of the committee members was appointed only a week after the conclusion of the Caratube v Kazakhstan annulment proceedings, in which I acted for the investor seeking to annul the award that the same committee member rendered as tribunal chair. When I asked the secretary-general to reconsider and appoint someone from the large number of ICSID panellists who were not in a similar situation, she declined. This left my client with no effective recourse. A challenge against one of the two ad hoc committee members would have to be decided by another in the same situation; a challenge to both would in practice be decided by the secretary general, who made the appointments. Again, this is not acceptable.

Continuity of ICSID secretaries.

As if the elephant was not already big enough, further difficulties arise when ICSID assigns to the ad hoc committee the same secretary who served in the original arbitration. This duplication of the secretarial role is unique to ICSID, which seems to have adopted it with the good intention of enhancing efficiency in case administration.

Yet, it is objectionable. The secretary, whatever their degree of contribution to the arbitration, has had some meaningful involvement in it. They have also had access to confidential information, be it on the arbitrators’ interactions, deliberations and shifts of opinion, the evolution of the draft award, and the factual, legal and quantum issues considered. If the award is flawed, the secretary may feel, or be perceived as having, some responsibility. Criticism of the award may imply some criticism of his or her work.

It is thus inappropriate to have the same person serving as secretary of the arbitral tribunal and ad hoc committee in the same case. This is true even if the secretary did not agree with the award and was ignored by the arbitral tribunal; he or she could directly or indirectly attempt to influence the ad hoc committee, or at least be in an embarrassing position.

The very fact that the secretary witnessed the arbitration and may have attended deliberations or have confidential information should be a bar to them assisting the ad hoc committee considering the award. In the recent Highbury International v Venezuela case, the applicant seeking annulment in fact officially asked that a different secretary be assigned to the annulment committee.

Immunity of annulment decisions

The last factor that has contributed to the growth of the elephant is the immunity that ad hoc committee members enjoy. Their annulment decisions terminate the process once and for all and cannot be challenged, whether at ICSID or at the enforcement stage before the courts of the ICSID Convention’s contracting states.

This may be a factor accounting for the growing number of ad hoc committee decisions where the underlying reasoning is poor or lacking. Take one recent ICSID annulment decision in favour of my client, US investor Joseph Lemire, against Ukraine. In that case, the ad hoc committee dismissed Ukraine’s application to annul a decision on jurisdiction and liability that was incorporated in the final award, on the ground that the state had waived its right to do so by failing to object to procedural violations relating to the decision between the time it was rendered and the issuance of the final award. As a result, the state could not rely on the truckload of annulment grounds relating to the decision on jurisdiction and liability that it was using to challenge the final award.

Despite the view of one of its members (who filed a concurring opinion) that these grounds should be addressed, the ad hoc committee simply said that the grounds would not have led to an annulment had they been entertained, without giving the slightest indication as to why. It was a sour victory for the winner, and a sour defeat for the loser from a purely legal perspective. The reality is that some of these decisions would not pass the scrutiny of the ICC Court or a national court.

Legal and psychological barriers

It is difficult to annul an award under most arbitration systems. And it should remain this way, because an annulment is not an appeal per se except when it comes, in certain legal systems, to jurisdictional questions.

Yet, the very term “annulment” has become a taboo in the world of arbitration, as if it were a revolutionary act against the system with an entirely negative impact. This adds an inappropriate psychological barrier to the existing legal barriers to annulment.

At ICSID, the barrier has reached an undesirable height. Since the Klöckner era, the pendulum has swung from one extreme to the other. As a result, the ICSID system is in danger of no longer being perceived, even by some of its greatest supporters, as a fair mechanism to resolve investment disputes of such monetary and strategic importance.

Admittedly some of the flaws I have described in the annulment system appear to be the result of well-intended measures to remedy its shortcomings and avoid unbargained-for annulments. Yet, they have created other pathologies, far worse in my opinion. In fact, I candidly admit that, in the past few years, I have won at least one annulment case that I deserved to have lost and lost another that I deserved to have won. I attribute this to one or more of the flaws in the system I have outlined in this article. As stated, what matters is perception – and mine will remain negative until these flaws are remedied.

In this context, how could users not be considering alternatives such as the ICC, where awards are scrutinised; arbitrators are nominated on the basis of a collegial system; checks and balances are in place to oversee the process of appointment and challenge of arbitrators; applications to annul awards are heard by judges at the seat of the arbitration; and there are further safeguards available to the losing party in third countries where enforcement is sought.
The cost-effectiveness of ICSID and its favourable enforcement mechanism are no longer sufficient to shift the balance in favour of the centre, even for claimants. And when a supporter and frequent user of ICSID such as myself reaches this conclusion, it means that the elephant has outgrown the room, and solutions must be explored.

To save the legitimacy of the process, ICSID could implement one or more of the following measures (provided they do not lead to undue bureaucracy or other pathologies):

  • constituting a collegial body for the appointment of ad hoc committee members sending its recommendations to the president of the Administrative Council;
  • introducing more consultation with the parties in the appointment of ad hoc committee members, including the circulation of a list of candidates to be ranked by the parties (a practice the current secretary general has adopted for certain appointments);
  • limiting the pool of candidates to those who sit exclusively on ad hoc committees or who have never had an ICSID award annulled;
  • granting the parties a power of veto over proposed ad hoc committee members whose awards have been subject to an annulment application;
  • introducing official scrutiny of annulment decisions by the same or another collegial body;
  • submitting challenges against ad hoc committee members to the same or another collegial body; and
  • assigning a different secretary to the annulment proceedings than the one who served in the original arbitration.

The principal beneficiary of these measures may be the ICSID secretary general, who will likely be delighted to have this difficult and thankless task of appointments lifted from his or her shoulders.

Cases referenced
Togo Electricité and GDF-Suez Energie Services v. Republic of Togo (ICSID Case No. ARB/06/7)
Enron Corporation and Ponderosa Assets,L.P.v. Argentine Republic (ICSID Case No. ARB/01/3)
Sempra Energy International v. The Argentine Republic (ICSID Case No. ARB/02/16)
HH Entreprises Investments Inc. v. Egypt (ICSID Case No. ARB/09/15)
Kılıç İnşaat İthalat İhracat Sanayi ve Ticaret Anonim Şirketi v. Turkmenistan (ICSID Case No. ARB/10/1)
Highbury International AVV and Ramstein Trading Inc v Venezuela (ICSID Case No. ARB/11/1), Grievance Report, dated 3 January 2014, from Highbury International AVV to ICSID
Caratube International Oil Company LLP v. Republic of Kazakhstan (ICSID Case No. ARB/08/12)
Joseph Charles Lemire v. Ukraine (ICSID Case No. ARB/06/18), Decision on Annulment, dated 8 July 2013

Conférence Annuelle du Comité Brésilien d’Arbitrage (CBAr)

Outre son intervention intitulée “As preclusões na arbitragem”, Yves Derains a prononcé le discours d’ouverture de la conférence annuelle du Comité Brésilien d’Arbitrage (CBAr) qui s’est déroulé du 21 au 23 septembre 2014 à Porto de Galinhas, au Brésil et dont le thème principal était « arbitrage et durée ». Un article publié par Global Arbitration Review (GAR) le 23 septembre 2014 résume les points essentiels d’Yves Derains sur l’équilibre entre célérité et procédure équitable dans l’arbitrage :

In launching the event, Derains, partner at Derains & Gharavi in Paris, noted the central tension in arbitration that parties in theory want rapid proceedings, but in practice follow other impulses. Derains focused on three main ways in which arbitrators can improve to ensure more efficient proceedings. First of all, he called for arbitrators to model proceedings to each specific case, as a tailor-made process cuts waste. (…). Arbitrators should determine which facts are and are not in dispute, and what kind of evidence may be needed to support certain points; while it is not easy, as arbitrators cannot belie any preference, it makes for a more efficient process overall. « I am sometimes shocked when I write an award that although we heard 25 witnesses, I am only referring to two, and I think, ‘why did we spend time hearing them, why did the parties bear the costs of preparing them’… he lamented. Derains also argued that arbitrators should enforce time limits more strictly within the arbitral process. « One of the plagues of arbitration is that arbitrators are too scared to enforce time limits which the parties themselves have created….and why? Because arbitrators […] think their award will be challenged if they don’t, and that is wrong: no judge would do that, » he said. Arbitrators should encourage parties to set reasonable time limits, and should warn them at the beginning of proceedings that those limits will be strictly enforced – reducing significantly abuse by counsel who simply assume an extension will be given. (…) The length of time taken by some arbitrators in producing the final award was also criticised by Derains, who said there was « absolutely no reason » to take a year to produce an award. Despite his exhortations for efficiency, Derains concluded by noting that in the balance between celerity and due process, the two elements do not have the same weight. « The purpose of arbitration is to resolve a dispute with a valid award, and for that you must respect due process. If you are very fast and there is no due process, there is no point, because the award will be null and void and you will have just wasted time. If you have to sacrifice one, please, sacrifice speed.«